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Ferrington, Hechler, and Parsons 
Jan~ell Parso~s (JP): ~he ~irst question we wanted to ask you, because we know you'll be 
~alkmg_a~out_1mme~wt10~ m your talk tomorrow, is how are you thinking about this notion of 
ur~medwtlon m re~atlonsh1p to affect? Or, maybe put another way, how did thinking about affect 
brmg you to wantmg to theorize a notion of immediation? 
Brian Massumi (Massumi): The two concerns came at the same time. My original interest in 
affect didn't separate affect out. It was enfolded with a number of issues, forming a kind of 
complex. That is why I was surprised when the term "affect theory" started being used and I 
found myself categorized as an affect theorist. It made no sense to me to approach it in 
separation, since it is a dimension of every event. What I was after, more than a theory of affect, 
was a philosophy of the event. In Parables for the Virtual, I approached the event through the 
question of movement, understood not as a simple displacement in space but as qualitative 
transformation. Affect was a way of getting at the qualitative registering, in the event, of change 
taking place. Affect comes flush with the event, in the immediacy of its occurring. But the 
registering wouldn't be of a transformation if there were not, wrapped in the affect, a sense of 
the state just left, as well as a sense of the shift in potential left for subsequent events to come. So 
immediacy couldn't be reduced to the present, figured in the traditional way as a width-less 
point of the present. It is, as William James said, a "saddle." It shades off in both directions into 
abstract, or non-present, dimensions of experience: the immediate past that is already no longer, 
and the future of potential that is not yet. I tried to address that inclusion of the abstract in the 
concreteness of experience through the concept of the virtual, highlighting the paradoxical 
question of how it is that the virtual - that which is real but abstract- might be actually felt. 
That question has stayed with me throughout my work, and became especially central in 
Semblance and Event, where I start turning to the concept of immediation in earnest. The 
question of immediation is: are there practices for making the potential dimension of affect 
more felt? This would amount to an intensification of experience, highlighting its changefulness. 
It requires practices of the event which take potential as their object. Which means, practices 
which take relation as their object, because potential, as the power to affect, is by definition 
relational. Changefulness, potential, relation: the question of immediation is immediately 
political. 
This is the terrain that the research-creation lab I have worked with since 2004 has 
explored. The SenseLab started from the question of what makes an event, and moved explicitly 
toward the question of immediation, which became the concern of a years-long collective 
project, some of the results of which will be presented soon in two collective volumes of the 
SenseLab's Immediations book series at Open Humanities Press. My thinking about immediation 
has been entirely bound up with the collective practice of the Sense Lab. 
JP: So, I think since you're talking about the SenseLab here, that maybe leads to the next 
question. We've been reading your The Power at the End of the Economy, but all of your wo~k 
seems to challenge the Cartesian rational / affective binaries we are so used to. You return agam 
and again to a need to rethink "the very concept of the rational in its relation to affect" (2). 
Could you talk for a minute about why we continue to cling to that division and what it might 
take for us to begin to move past it? To understand the rational and the affective as intertwined? 
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Massumi: The trick is to overcome the Cartesian dichotomy without throwing out the ability to 
make distinctions. Affirming one side of the dichotomy over the other just reproduces it, except 
with half of it under erasure. That makes it difficult, if not impossible, to give an account of the 
aspects of reality the suppressed term was trying to make thinkable. The tendency is then for 
the pendulum to swing back, to recover what can no longer be accounted for. The result is a 
sterile oscillation. The question is never "either-or." It is always a question of co-occurrence. In 
what distribution? With what concurrences or inferences? How does the one implicate the 
other? Can one become the other? If one can become the other, can they be construed as degrees 
on the same continuum? What kind of events contain both in germ, and how and why do they 
diverge from that embryonic coming-together? The capacity to diverge requires that we 
maintain distinctions, even that troubling Cartesian distinction between the mental and the 
physical. However, the co-occurrence, co-implication, and reciprocal becoming requires that we 
refrain from rigidifying the distinction into a dichotomy, or only operate with that distinction. 
What is needed is what I call a logic of differential mutual inclusion: a kind of monism of the 
multiple that studies how distinctions, any number of distinctions, and a proliferating count of 
them, come differently together. Philosophy is the art of making and multiplying distinctions. 
Nothing is thrown out, not even the bugbear of the rational. 
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What rational thought does when it strives to separate itself from affect is to judge as if it 
could stand aside from events and from that neutral vantage. point assess the best course of 
action based on the most complete understanding of order and causality it can arrive at. This 
conveniently brackets its constitutive co-implication with affect. As Hume argued, reason can 
rationalize many things, but its own exercise is not one of them: it can give no ultimate reason 1 
........ ~--.~-"' 
why reason is better. That is why its use is so often the object of passionate exhortation. It has to 
1 ~ ......... -t 
overpower the passions - in effect, make itself prime among them. Reason, then, is a passion. 
The preachy, overbearing affective tone of contemporary champions of rationality, such as r cEIUNG 
Richard Dawkins, says as much. But it is not only its birth that is affectively inflected, but also ~~:1~~M 
its end. Hume also pointed out that reason has nothing in its own operation that can tell it when 
to stop. It has a stopping problem, not unlike the halting problem in computer programming. 
NT PORCH (6' WID 
There might always be a key consideration or bit of information that was missed but could well 
prove crucial. Reason is, in fact, the functional equivalent of doubt. Its ruminations, endless by RST FLOOR 
right, can only be cut off by taking an affectively propelled leap into action at what is felt to be 
the propitious moment. This is an act of intuition. Affect is belief in the world- a noncognitve, -----
embodied belief in the world's potential, directly felt, and no sooner felt than acted-upon. =-=--= 
Without the corrective of doubt, affectively propelled action will often go awry. But without 
belief in the world, action is impossible. We are always plunging headlong into events, affect as 
the leading edge. 
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In The Power at the End of Economy I develop a number of vocabularies to talk about the 
differential mutual inclusion of rationality and affect in the event, specifically as it relates to 
economic thinking. The key is to understand that thought is not all on the side of reason, 
making affect simply irrational or unthinking. I build on Peirce's concepts of perceptual 
judgment and abduction, which are modes of hypothetical thought that come flush with the 
event, enveloped in affect. Affect has what Whitehead would call a "mental pole" to its 
operation. By this he means the capacity to "prehend" novelty, or inHume's terms, to exceed the 
given. This is what affect, as the feeling of capacitation and potential, contributes. Affect is not 
the opposite of thought. It is the movement of thought. It is the force of thought, embodied. It 
comes before conscious rumination, alimenting it with the direct perceptual judgments that hit 
like fate in the incipience of every event, but already with a felt sense of potential alternatives. 
In this aspect, it carries a force of what I call in The Power at the End of the Economy, borrowing 
from the linguist Oswald Ducrot, presupposition. Enveloped in the affect of every dawning 
event is a presuppositional field, proposing action. This is a lived thinking of importance, of 
situational constraint and enablement. But affect's force of thought also comes at the end, 
pressing beyond the given into the future, in the form of abductive leaps into a hypothetical 
course of action whose importance has yet to play out. In this aspect, it constitutes an enactive 
speculation. Affect, throughout, is what I call a "thinking-feeling." It is in no way the opposite or 
the absence of thought. It is in fact rationality that is a limited expression of the power of 
thought, of which affect is the impetus and leading edge. Affect and rationality are differentially 
mutually included on the continuum of thought- which is coextensive with the continuum of 
feeling. It is often where conscious rumination is silenced that thought is most effective. Many 
performers, in art and sport, speak of the need to silence the "ir:mer monologue" and refrain 
from "overthinking," to make their thinking coincide with their movements, rather than direct 
them. 
In what I just said, the added distinctions of thought and feeling were added to situate 
the way in which rationality and affect come together, in their difference. These added 
distinctions are not there to eliminate or subsume the distinction between rationality and affect, 
but to carry their difference. 
JP: So kind of continuing along in this vein of these binaries and breaking them down and 
thinking about them in relationship to each other, how do you think about affect in relationship 
to language? So for example, if we want to recenter the event, rather than bodies and subjects as 
I think you said to start, in our scholarship, how do we capture those affective intensities of the 
event via language? Can they be captured linguistically? Should we be capturing them 
linguistically? 
Massumi: That's a really central question . I don't think affect can be captured by language. I 
don't think it can be captured by anything without a remainder. There's always something that 
escapes because affect has to do with potential and potential can't all actualize at one time. That 
is the meaning of my widely misunderstood term, "the autonomy of affect." Affect is not 
autonomous from thought, or from language, in the sense of being separated from them or in 
opposition to them. The point of the concept is that whatever the formation you are talking 
about, affect will pre-infuse it with importance at the incipient levet and carry over a surplus of 
potential at the end of the exercise of whatever mode of activity the formation's operations are 
dedicated to. This surplus-over, remaindered at each pulse of process, for more to come, is the 
autonomy of affect. 
Specifically in relation to language, this means that there is an unabsorbed remainder of 
meaning left over after the statement is said and done. This is meaning that has yet to come to 
determinate expression, so it is, strictly speaking nonsense. But is not nonsense simply as the 
opposite of sense. It is nonsense as a surplus of sense, brewing with meanings to come. It is 
what Guattari, following Hjelmslev, sometimes calls "purport"- pure matter of meaning, as yet 
syntactically and semantically unformed, but already pragmatically preaccelerated. The purport 
narrows down toward determinate expression as the event of expression begins to take force. It 
forms, for the coming expression, a presuppositional field of the kind I was just talking about. 
Another word for that field is a "proposition." A proposition, according to Whitehead, 
cannot be reduced to its linguistic content. To do so, he says, is the fundamental error of logic. A 
proposition is a pattern of contrasts delineating alternative courses of the universe, embedded 
in a certain juncture of history. He puts it in those terms to prevent us from saying "alternative 
choices." For, he says, "the proposition awaits its subject." The subject of the statement is 
emergent from the playing out of the expression. It is emergent and occurrent. This asignifying, 
asubjective dimension of this primary phase of an event where the matter of meaning begins to 
narrow down toward a determinate issue is not in language. It is in the world, immanent to the 
act of language. It is what comes to expression through language. "Prelinguistic" would be a bad 
terminological choice for this . It is more "prolinguistic": toward language, in an anticipatory 
dimension that is immanent to its exercise, but cannot be reduced to its structure and 
signification. In What Animals Teach Us About Politics, I argue that animal play sets in place the 
conditions for language at this level, even where language as such is absent. "lnfralinguistic" is 
in fact a better word than "prolinguistic" for that dimension. And that dimension is affect. Affect 
cannot be divorced from language, even where language is absent. It is infralinguistic. Its 
relation to language has the paradoxical status I talk about in relation to the capitalist field in 
The Principle of Unrest and 99 Th eses for the Revaluation of Value of the "immanent outside": of it, 
but in it. It makes no more sense to say that an act of expression is outside language as it does to 
say that we can stand outside capitalism. There is no outside of either, in the spatialized sense of 
an external realm over against an interior realm. This in no way means that everything is "in" 
(capitalism, language). It's a question of modes and degrees of inclusion, anticipatorily and in 
fulfilment. In other words, as is always the case with affect, it is a question of potential and its 
playing out. 
How can language capture modes of affective intensity? The more it tries to capture 
them, the more they slip away, following the prerogatives of the autonomy of affect. 
Significations and propositions in the conventional logical sense try to capture affective 
intensity, and fail. It is always already elsewhere before the last "i" is dotted. What language can 
do is carry affective intensities. Language can make its movement coincide with the force of 
thought moving through affect. It can create openings for the autonomy of affect to lead it, 
rather than trying to subsume affect under its own structure and enclose it in its semantic 
content. It can follow affective movements as tensors of meaning in their dynamic making. The 
structure of language, and its formal propositions, are then catalysts for the self-expression of 
affect, rather than its overlord. The affective force of language moves across words, carried in 
their rhythm. When you feel that the meaning is as much in the gaps between the words as in 
the words themselves, and that it continues virtually after the words have ended, in the 
linguistic equivalent of one those optical illusions when you turn your eye from an image and 
you see virtual movement spin off from it, then you are feeling the affective force of language. 
We tend to call expressions that make that force felt "poetic," regardless of their genre. That's just 
the word we reach for when language is outdoing itself affectively. A good philosophical text is 
"poetic" in this way, however far it is from poetry as such. It carries a conceptually complex 
movement of thought that wants nothing more than to keep generating more concepts, beyond 
where the author stopped. A text carrying affective intensity is a generative text. From the 
autonomy of affect it inherits the surplus-value of always having more to say than it knew how 
to say- forcing a continuation in the same vein of thought. 
Jacob Ferrington (JF): Thinking about a field of potentiality as kind of collapsing into a decision, 
and the lived experience of somebody making a decision ~nd sort of rationalizing or 
cognitively / linguistically accounting for their decisions, how does that play into this discussion 
of this mutually constitutive affect and cognition that it seems like you're getting to? 
Massumi: Subjects don't make decisions- events make decisions. What we call the subject is an 
outcome of decision. We retrospectively own decisions. Whitehead says that decision should be 
taken in its etymological sense of "to cut." Decision is in the world, it's in the way the world's 
activity parses itself. It's in the way in which self-affirming modes of activity - tendencies, in a 
word- interfere and resonate with others toward a complex playing out that ends in a crossing 
from one threshold of consistency and co-composition to another. Decision is the cut, the cusp, 
of an emergent composition of forces. Whitehead also says that it is the exception, not the rule, 
when this happens at the conscious level of cogitation and reflection. Consciousness, he says, is 
the "acme of experience," underwritten by nonconscious levels of experience shrouded in the 
incipiency of thought and action. Consciousness follows the playing-out of those levels as they 
peak into an emergent composition of forces- taking "follow" both in the sense of coming after 
and in the sense of being in the wake of. The nonconscious level is replete with activity, of the 
propositional or presuppositional kind I was talking about before. It's the realm of what I call 
"bare activity" (an as yet asignifying, nonsubject-bound incipient working-out). 
One of the things that happens at that level is "priming": the modulation of action by 
nonconsciously registered cues falling in the gaps of consciousness, which, again quoting 
Whitehead, is not continuous, but rather continuously "flickers." The importance of priming is 
that it forbids any notion of "raw experience." Words can prime nonconsciously. In other words, 
"higher functions," the results of learned behavior of great complexity, fold back into bare 
activity through priming. I spend a great deal of time in The Power at the End of the Economy and 
Ontopower developing the concept of priming and talking about the implications of it. In 
Parables I approached it under the rubric of the "feedback of higher forms." The point is that the 
so-called "lower" levels of forming experience are no less complex - in fact, they are in many 
respects more complex - than the "higher," conscious levels. And that although experience at 
that level is not accessible to sovereign, conscious decision, it is open to modulation, and there 
are techniques for that modulation. This suggests alternative modes of affect-based politics. The 
status of rationality must be resituated in this context. Rationality is one modulatory technique 
feeding back into bare activity among others. It is by no means the only one or, in our period, 
the most effective. 
JF: That might be a good space for us to move into a question about the sense of, say, a voter 
who sees herself as an autonomous subject and when it comes to walking into the voting booth 
and casting a vote, how do you conceive of what we'll call the event-space of voting? So what 
drives a consumer to act the way a consumer acts but also a voter? The ideas we were thinking 
of in this situation were priming and jamming specifically and how that relational field brings 
about these seemingly autonomous subjects who go in and change. And also in the back of my 
head I'm thinking of this group of quote-unquote Obama voters who became Trump voters -
what is happening there in that emergent shift? 
Massumi: Voting is a way of individualizing co-activity. It's an activity that individuals do 
together - completely separately. It's a mechanism for decollectivizing activity. This makes it a 
power mechanism, in and of itself, and not only through its outcomes. Voting is a mass staging 
of individuals as - as if they were - separate autonomous willing subjects. It produces an 
effective feeling of this "as if. " It destroys any sense of the collective as transindividual - or 
infraindividual (which can also be called the "dividual"). 
Voting primes individuals into a sense of separation, in seclusion from every other 
individual, literally curtained off from any collective dynamic. Here, the collective figures as the 
simple opposite of decision-making individual segregation. It fosters the feeling that the 
collective is just some kind of magma of undifferentiated - or more like it in these days of 
migrant panic, an uncontrollably hyperdifferentiated - humanity threatening to swamp the self 
and disable decision. This primes for a tendentially aggressive, even paranoid, stance toward 
the collective. The last thing it does is carve out a space of reflection and considered decision. 
Instead, it catapults the individual all the more powerfully into affective mechanisms, but in an 
apparent vacuum of sociality and relationality. In that vacuum, decision is no longer a matter of 
passing a threshold to an emergent co-composition. It is formatted as a zero-sum game, 0 or 1, 
yes or no, thumbs up or down. This makes decision an exercise in mutual exclusion, rather than 
differential mutual inclusion. 
The vote in representative democracy, particularly in the age of social media, has become 
an accelerator of relationally unhinged affect, so much so that calls for a return to rationality 
ring ridiculously hollow. It's to the point that basing a decision on the reasonableness of an 
argument strikes voters as counterintuitive. Evidence-based thinking, or what the Bush 
administration criticized as "reality-based" thinking, can't compete. It is often said we are in a 
post-fact world. I think that where we are in is the realm of the affective fact. 
A matter-of-fact in process-oriented philosophy is the finality of an emergence that plays 
out the consequences of a thinking-feeling pulse of bare activity, peaking in the crossing of a 
threshold that makes an irreversible difference. That crossing of the threshold, because it is 
irreversible, because it has added something to the world that can't be undone, has import that 
makes relating to it imperative, and that imperative is directly felt. The next pulse of process 
cannot not take into account toward its own peaking. The thing is that the affective aspect can 
come without the crossing of the threshold actually taking place. A threat, for example, 
produces the fear and the felt imperative to flee or fight, even in the absence of an actual danger. 
This is "unhinged" in the sense that threats can conjure themselves with abandon, independent 
of the actual conditions for their fulfilment, taking effect purely affectively. This is what I call an 
affective fact. An affective fact is the felt imperative of an event that did not take place, except 
through the feeling of the potential that it might. It is a fact because once the potential has been 
felt, its consequences actually expressed, for example in fear, it can't be unfelt. It's irreversible. 
The fear has transpired, and can recur. It remains looming. A threshold has been crossed, but 
without ever leaving the realm of potential. The event is purely affectively felt, in the 
conditional: in the might-be, or could-have-been, or would-have-been. In an increasingly 
chaotic, far-from-equilibrium world, individuals are buffeted, through the media and the social 
media in particular, by the constant barrage of threats. The world has morphed into what 
security analysts call the "threat environment." We are barraged by affective facts, roiling 
together, increasingly autonomous in their triggering. The isolated voter in the booth is 
hard-pressed to counter this with evidence-based reasoning. 
However, in the end it's really not so much a question of fact versus affect, 
evidence-based rationality versus affect. In a sense, all matters-of-fact are affective facts, if we 
think of the genesis of every event in thinking-feeling, and the autonomy of affect running 
through events. It is more a question of postures toward potential, toward uncertainty and the 
unknown, corresponding to different valences, different modalities of affective fact: atomizing 
or relational; zero-sum or shaded and graded; trans/infra individual or "as if" merely 
individual; mutually inclusive or mutually exclusive; differential or hegemonic; positively 
bracing or paranoia-inducing; composing a world or exuding a threat environment; equal to the 
complexity of the event, or violently reductive of it in exasperated reaction to its element of 
uncontrollability. These are ways of rehearsing the Spinozist distinction, taken up by Nietzsche, 
between active and reactive forces. And it is as a function of this distinction that democracy 
needs to be reinvented, beyond representative democracy, in new forms of direct democracy. 
I'm not at all saying that evidence-based reason and rationality have no role. In this age 
of complexity and environmental emergency, to argue that rational assessment and 
instrumental reason have no role would be self-defeating. It is just to say that there no sense in 
returning to the fiction of their sovereign power of decision. That is just as self-defeating. The 
role of rationality has always been as course-corrector for affective movements- as a feedback 
of higher forms that acts as a prime to modulate the playing out of affective processes. The 
answer is not to oppose reason and affect, but to return reason to its affective ground, and to do 
so strategically, in ways that prime for differential mutual inclusion and peaks of decision that 
actively affirm life in all its complexity. Rationality has to learn to be a catalyst, instead of a 
sovereign. This is a necessity of survival as we hurtle into the growing effects of climate change. 
The neoliberal and liberal democratic priming for the "as if' of individual decision, supposedly 
governed by rational deliberation, and supposedly leveraging self-interest for the general good, 
has had a central role in leading us to this impasse, which is an inevitable outcome of the 
capitalist drive for more, for quantitative increase at all costs - with which liberal democracy 
has always been in symbiosis, to the point that under neoliberalism the nation-state has become 
little more than a territorial operator-console for the capitalist process. More of the same will 
only yield just that - more of the same. And in this context, more of the same is global 
catastrophe. 
JF: This leads me to something we've been discussing in the course, intersectionality and 
assemblage theory and trying to understand how that might work especially in relation to 
identity politics which I think reigns a little bit on the left, and I'm wondering if you can talk a 
little bit about how that might inform this discussion. 
Massumi: Affect theory - or as I prefer to name my own orientation, process thinking - is in 
many ways incompatible with identity politics. But to situate any critique of identity politics, it 
is crucial to start from the incontrovertible reality that the first, and still dominant, identity 
politics is the European identity politics of whiteness. Identity as we understand it today is an 
outcome of the dual genesis by which a purportedly sovereign subject mirroring at a smaller 
scale the sovereign nation-state to which it belongs by right arose out of the crucible of 
colonialism and the slave trade, issuing at the same time, as on parallel tracks, into the brutal 
rise of modern capitalism and the Enlightenment ideal of progress. The identity politics of 
oppressed and marginalized minority groups is in reaction to this ur-identity politics, in an 
attempt to turn its own model against it in order to oblige the dominant white society to live up 
to its rhetoric of progress and inclusion. The strength of this approach is that takes a known, 
historically validated form - that of identity - and uses it to confound the dominant usage, 
which has historically been for purposes of exclusion. The problem is that exclusion is written 
into the form of identity itself. Identity organizes itself around the self/other, 
in-group I out-group opposition. This is not incidental to it; it is of its essence. As a result, 
exclusion effects are impossible to expunge. They are just shifted down the road. You can see 
this when any identity-based contestation achieves a certain success, carving out a space of 
inclusion and recognition for itself. The identity schizzes. The success of second-wave feminism, 
for example, was experienced as an exclusion by lesbians and women of color. The success of 
the homosexual rights movement was in tension with the trans community, which had to rise 
up for its own account. 
The fact is that people do not live in their identity, they live their differencing. I say 
differencing because it continues. Every recognition of an identity leaves out a fraction that must 
then affirm itself and fight for its own recognition, leading to a proliferation of subdivisions and 
an expanding abbreviation list, now far exceeding the original "LBG" (I'm old enough to 
remember a time before there was even a "T"). I commented on this cascading of difference 
away from the form and content of what at the time I was calling the Man-Standard of 
whiteness almost thirty years ago in User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia. That tendency 
has only accelerated since. This is as it should be: differencing is fractal. It does not stop at a 
convenient boundary line, however finely cut. Its movement exceeds every category, so the only 
way to keep up with it and approximate its scope is to keep madly multiplying the categories. 
But at a certain point, another logic has to set in. An individual life is not a particular case of a 
general identity category, however finely defined. An individual life is a singularity, and 
singularities come not in categories but in populations, irreducibly dynamic and with fuzzy 
boundaries. An individual is a fuzzy subset of a population. Individuals do not identify so 
much as they schizz- invent a sui generis variation on the population to which they dynamically 
and complexly belong. Society is dividual. Every population is internally diverse, and the same 
is true of every individual within each population. There is always something in an individual 
that does not fit its assigned category, and that even in utter isolation stands for what Deleuze 
and Guattari call a "people to come": an emergent mode of life. 
Intersectionality is helpful to start getting at this complexity, realizing that identity lines 
cross, and everyone occupies a certain locus on the intersectional grid. But this doesn't go far 
enough, because it is still speaking in terms of identity, general category, and particular case. It 
compounds particularity, rather than fractalizing or dividualizing it, to grasp what Erin 
Manning calls the "diversity in diversity": the differing of difference. There's a lot of thinking in 
queer and decolonial thought and in the black radical tradition that go in this direction. 
Particularly inspiring to me have been Edouard Glissant's concept of "relation identity" and 
Moten and Harney's concept of the "undercommons," both of which propose a black sociality 
that opposes the dominant identity politics of whiteness without appealing to the traditional 
identity form. Although I have deep reservations about identity politics, and many aspects of its 
culture on the left, I see the need for it in the macro political domain, as a matter of self-defense 
and survival, and bristle at many criticisms of it, most especially from the right. It's a bit of a red 
herring to point the finger at the identity politics of the left. It is simply succumbing to media 
stereotypes. There is so much more to the social movements that is too complex to be 
meme-worthy, and so barely registers in the media. It's also a diversion from the point I started 
with: that the first and by far the most virulent and destructive identity politics is white identity 
politics. 
Alina Hechler (AH): And I guess kind of to close up on that, or end on maybe a more positive 
or futuristic note, in The Principle of Unrest you have said that considering the limits of political 
reason, and these affective facts that are kind of immune to a consistent rational argument, how 
can we move forward? In The Principle of Unrest you have suggested a politics of care. So in a 
sense, by pure rationality or pure argument we're not going to be able to turn the tide 
ultimately, so how could we practice a politics of care or promote that? 
Massumi: It's something we need to invent collectively. It's not easy. The first thing is to really 
let it sink in that a politics of care is not about a personal attribute. It's not about having a 
subjective feeling of care for someone else. That is more a politics of empathy. It doesn't work, 
because it is based on the face-to-face . It begins by subjectivizing the relation, upstream of any 
encounter. It puts the other across from the self on the outside, but then, as by a sleight of hand, 
includes the outside in a structure of mirroring. The mirroring is supposed to be of a 
commonality, of a common humanity reflected in the faces opposite each other. But this is very 
often more of an imposition than an invitation, because it neglects to ask the question, 
"commonality according to whom?" It is in fact an essential gesture of whiteness: assuming 
we're all the same deep down, "we're all human," so can't we all just get along? To which the 
answer is another question: "on whose terms?" Expressions of empathy risk doing the exact 
opposite of what they're meant to do because they neutralize the political, by making the 
political personal. 
A politics of care in the way I mean it has to be a quality of the event, not of a subject. It's 
a question of how the conditions for events are put into place. It assumes fractalization, not 
facialization. It assumes that the social field is made up of differentials, not boundary lines, 
however crossed. It assumes incommensurability: that if you scratch the surface of the mirror, 
you see that we are all differencing, each in our own dividual/transindividual manner, 
schizzing the populations to which we would belong into renewed being, always in becoming. 
Commonality is a veneer of whiteness. There is no commonality across the board. But that 
doesn't mean we can't live together. There is a word for a dynamic cohabitation of individuals 
and populations in correlated becoming, always already gone· differing: ecology. A politics of 
care is not about political psychology, it is a political ecology. Neither does it concern itself with 
ideology. It concerns itself with emergent comings-together: events of differential 
coming-together from which no common denominator is drawn, but which precipitate a further 
difference. It requires techniques of the event, which is what we have been working at the 
SenseLab for many years. These are techniques of relation, and of collective attunement to the 
mix of tendencies afoot, the potentials they carry, and how they can be primed. This can be 
theorized in terms of a revised notion of sympathy, in contradistinction to empathy, and that is a 
big part of the project in What Animals Teach us About Politics and The Power at the End of the 
Economy. 
AH: I had a question that I'm personally really interested in- we as fledgling academics, the 
academy is increasingly under siege, at least from a budgetary standpoint and everything, you 
know, and there seems to be a stratification that we become more and more isolated, and I have 
a sense that your work with the SenseLab might speak a little bit to this. What is our role in that, 
in creating that conditioning relational events as academics? 
Massumi: At the SenseLab, we're looking at creating an alter-university space, parasitical to the 
university. We mean that also in the sense of constituting a "para-site," a site that occupies a 
stratum adjacent to the university, operating by a different logic, not necessarily against it 
frontally, but rather maintaining what Erin Manning, who founded the SenseLab, calls an 
"approximation of proximity," so that we can avail ourselves of what the university has 
positively to offer without being beholden to it. Alter-"university" is a misnomer. It won't give 
credit or degrees, and it won't have a traditional course structure with the usual student-teacher 
hierarchy. It will be self-organizing, like the SenseLab, and oriented toward emergent results 
embodying collective expressions. We're calling it the 3 Ecologies Institute. Experimentation in 
new forms of value and collective alter-economies is a key aspect, in response to the student 
debt crisis. 3E will be organized along the lines of a gift economy. A basic principle is never to 
charge for anything, as has been the practice all along at SenseLab. Hence the urgency of 
alter-economic thinking. Personally, we're feeling cornered by the university, as it conforms 
more and more to the dictates of the neoliberal value system and management model. I have 
already left the university, through the privileged door of early retirement, and Erin is just 
holding on. The 3 Ecologies does not feel optional to us. It's a matter of survival. It's imperative 
that we find ways of creating sustaining milieus for thinking and acting together, imbued by a 
politics of care. They must be open to segments of the population for whom higher education is 
traditionally inaccessible, including those who are neurodiverse. This requires sustained 
attention to techniques of relation. The idea is to create a pre-figurative milieu- one of many, for 
there are projects of this nature popping up everywhere - enacting emergent modes of relation 
and new forms of knowledge production. There is no time to go more into detail here. Readers 
can refer to the SenseLab Web site (senselab.ca) for more details and links. 
